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Abstract
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. We show
that there exists a strongly polynomial-time algorithm that always computes an
allocation satisfying Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item even
if the utilities are mixed and the agents have asymmetric weights. The result
does not hold if either of Pareto optimality or PROP1 is replaced with slightly
stronger concepts.
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1. Introduction
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. For
an agent, an item can be a good (yielding positive utility) or a chore (yielding
negative utility). Fair allocation of indivisible items has received renewed in-
terest since it was proved that a Pareto optimal (PO) and envy-free up to one
item (EF1) allocation exists for positive utilities [8]. However, the existence
and complexity of a Pareto optimal (PO) and EF1 allocation is open when util-
ities may be negative. The complexity of computing such an allocation is also
open for the case of positive utilities. In view of these open questions, a natural
relaxation of EF1 called proportionality up to one item (PROP1) has started
to receive deeper interest. PROP1 requires each agent gets utility that is at
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least her proportionality guarantee if she loses her biggest chore or alternatively
obtain the biggest good allocated to some other agent.
Interestingly, even the existence and complexity of PROP1 and Pareto op-
timal allocation has been an open problem when the utilities are mixed or even
negative (see e.g. a recent survey by Freeman and Shah [12]). We study this
central problem. In previous work, the existence of PROP1 and PO allocations
has been established only in the context of goods (positive utilities) and very
recently for the case of chores.
For the case of goods, Conitzer et al. [9] posed the complexity of computing a
PROP1 and PO allocation as an open problem. They had proved that a PROP1
and PO outcomes always exists even for a public decision making setting that is
more general than allocation of indivisible goods. Barman and Krishnamurthy
[6] presented a strongly polynomial-time algorithm that always finds a PROP1
and PO allocation for positive utilities. Braˆnzei and Sandomirskiy [7] proved
that there exists a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for chores that always
finds a weighted PROP1 and PO allocation if the number of agents or items is
fixed. For mixed utilities, Aziz et al. [2] presented a strongly polynomial-time
algorithm to compute a PROP1 and PO allocation when the number of agents
is two. They also present a strongly polynomial-time algorithm to compute
an EF1 allocation for any number of agents if the preference relation satisfies
double monotonicity.
Contribution. We show that even for the case of mixed utilities and any number
of agents, an fPO (property stronger than PO) and PROP1 allocation always ex-
ists. In particular, we design a strongly polynomial-time algorithm that achieves
fPO and PROP1 even if the number of agents or items is not fixed, the utilities
are mixed and the agents have asymmetric weights. We obtain as corollaries
several recent results that have been proved for only goods or only chores or for
weaker requirements.
Method. Our results are based on the rounding argument: we first compute a
proportional fPO allocation with divisible items and then round it in a clever
way that preserves fPO property and ensures PROP1. The known results for
goods [6] and for chores [7] use the same methodology; however, they heav-
ily rely on the concept of competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI)
both for computing the initial divisible allocation and for the rounding part.
Currently, no algorithms are known for CEEI in economies with mixture of
goods and chores, which makes the case of mixed items special and existing
approaches inapplicable. We circumvent this difficulty by constructing a round-
ing procedure that does not rely on equilibrium prices and is applicable to any
fPO proportional allocation of divisible items with acyclic consumption graph.
To compute such an input allocation we start from the equal division and then
find a Pareto-dominating allocation by conducting sequential cyclic trades, the
old economic insight recently embodied as an algorithm by Sandomirskiy and
Segal-Halevi [14].
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2. Preliminaries
We consider the allocation of m items in set O to n agents in set N . Each
agent i ∈ N has a weight bi > 0 where
∑
i∈N bi = 1.
Each item is allocated fully. If each item is allocated to exactly one agent,
we call the allocation integral. We will generally denote a fractional allocation
by x = (x1, . . . , xn) where xi is the allocation of agent i and xi,o is the fraction
of item o given to agent i. We will typically denote an integral allocation by pi
where pii denotes the allocated set of items of agent i.
By ui(o) we denote the agent i’s utility of receiving the whole item o. The
utilities ui(o) may have mixed signs: an item o can be a chore for some i
(ui(o) < 0), a good for another agent j (uj(o) > 0), and a neutral item for some
agent k (uk(o) = 0). Agents have additive utilities over allocations: ui(xi) =∑
o∈O ui(o)xi,o and similarly ui(pii) =
∑
o∈pii
ui(o) in case of integral allocation.
An allocation y Pareto improves an allocation x if ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for all
i ∈ N and for some i the inequality is strict. We will call an integral allocation
Pareto optimal (PO), if no integral allocation improves it. An allocation that
cannot be improved by any fractional allocation is called fPO. Clearly, an fPO
integral allocation is PO as well.
An allocation x is weighted PROP if for each agent i ∈ N , ui(xi) ≥ ui(O)bi.
An integral allocation pi is weighted PROP1 if for each agent i ∈ N ,
• ui(pii) ≥ ui(O)bi; or
• ui(pii) + ui(o) ≥ ui(O)bi for some o ∈ O \ pii; or
• ui(pii)− ui(o) ≥ ui(O)bi for some o ∈ pii.
In the literature, PROP1 was studied with respect to goods by Conitzer
et al. [9]. It has recently been considered for mixed utilities [2].
When bi = 1/n for all i ∈ N , weighted PROP1 is equivalent to PROP1.
For any fractional or integral allocation x, the corresponding consumption
graph Gx is a bipartite graph with vertices (N ∪ O) and the edge set E =
{{i, o} | xi,o > 0}. If an agent i shares an item with an agent j we call j, agent
i’s neighbor.
3. Algorithm
We show that a PO and weighted PROP1 always exists and it can be com-
puted in strongly-polynomial time even for mixed utilities. One possible al-
gorithmic approach for achieving such allocations is to start from a PROP1
allocation and find a Pareto optimal Pareto improving allocation. However,
finding an integral allocation that is a Pareto improvement over another inte-
gral allocation is generally a computationally hard problem (see e.g. Aziz et al.
[1] and de Keijzer et al. [10]) even for the case of goods. Also, a Pareto im-
provement over a PROP1 allocation may not even satisfy PROP1. We provide
explicit examples (Examples 2 and 3) for this phenomenon.
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In view of the challenges encountered in finding Pareto improvements while
maintaining PROP1, we take another route that has been popularized recently
(see e.g. Barman and Krishnamurthy [6] and [14]): deal with fractional alloca-
tions that are Pareto improving and convert them to suitable integral alloca-
tions.
Our idea is to start with a fractional proportional allocation xprop and then
find a fractional Pareto optimal allocation x that Pareto improves xprop. We
ensure that the consumption graph of x is acyclic. The acyclicity of the con-
sumption graph is critically used to carefully round x into an integral allocation.
The algorithm is described as Algorithm 1. The way the rounding is done is
illustrated in Example 1. By acyclicity, the consumption graph of x is a collec-
tion of trees. The rounding algorithm picks an agent i who shares some items
with other agents, and rounds all her fractions to her advantage: give to i any
good a he shares, and give any chore b to someone with whom he was sharing.
In the subtree starting at an agent j who was sharing a or b with i, break all
the other partial shares of j to her advantage. And so on. The acyclicity of the
tree guarantees that this algorithm terminates and returns a PROP1 allocation.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 1 returns an integral allocation that is weighted PROP1
in time O(n2m2(n+m)).
Proof. Let us show that the returned allocation x∗ satisfies weighted PROP1.
Since the divisible allocation x from the Step 2 is an fPO allocation that Pareto
dominates xprop, it satisfies weighted PROP. This property is preserved when
shared zero items are allocated entirely to one of the owners at Step 4.
While-cycles (Steps 6 to 16) implement breadth-first exploration of the con-
sumption graph combined with reallocation of shared items (the inner cycle
explores agents in each connected component and outer cycle allows to switch
between components). The algorithm touches no item consumed fully by one
agent; only shared items are reallocated entirely to one of the original partial-
owners. Thus to ensure that x∗ is weighted PROP1, it is enough to show that
any agent j can lose at most one partially consumed good (an item o such that
uj(o) > 0, xj,o ∈ (0, 1)) or get an increased share of at most one partially-
consumed chore (uj(o) < 0, xj,o ∈ (0, 1)) and these two cases are mutually
exclusive.
Let us call an agent j picked by the internal while-cycle active. All the items
shared by the active agent are allocated by the for-cycle in her favor (j receives
all her shared goods and gets rid of all shared chores); later on her allocation
does not change. Therefore, the only possibility for j’s utility at x∗ to be lower
compared to x is if she loses her goods or gets more chores before becoming
active. This means that at an earlier stage of the algorithm there was an active
agent i that shared an item o with j and either this item o was a good both
for i and j (in this case, the algorithm allocated it to i taking away one of j’s
goods) or o was a chore for both i and j and was allocated to j since she was
the lowest-index neighbor of i. We call such i a predecessor of j.
By acyclicity of the consumption graph, j can have at most one predecessor.
Indeed, the if j has two predecessors i and i′, then there is a path in the
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm to find a weighted PROP1 and PO allocation
Input: An instance I = (N,O, u, b)
Output: Integral allocation x∗
1 Start with a proportional allocation xprop that gives a share bi of each
item to each agent i.
2 Find an fPO fractional allocation x that Pareto dominates xprop and has
an acyclic consumption graph Gx (computed via the algorithm from
Lemma 2.5 in (Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi [14])).
3 Round the fractional allocation x into an integral allocation x∗ as follows:
4 If some j shares an item o for which uj(o) = 0, we give it fully to an agent
i who shares o in x. Update x so that xi,o = 1 and xj,o = 0 for all j 6= i.
5 Q← ∅, an empty FIFO (First-In-First-Out) queue of agents
6 while there is an agent i sharing at least one item o with others do
7 Add i to Q
8 while Q is non-empty do
9 Take the first agent j out of Q
10 Add all the neighbors of j to the end of Q
11 for each o shared by j do
12 if uj(o) > 0 then
13 give o fully to j
14 else if uj(o) < 0 then
15 give o to a neighbor with whom o is shared
16 Update x
17 return x∗ = x
/* For definiteness, we use the following tie-braking
conventions. Zero item o is given to the lowest-index i
who shares o on step 4. While-cycle 6 takes agent i who
shares exactly one item (such i exists by acyclicity of
Gx as long as there is at least one shared item); if
there are multiple such i, the lowest-index agent is
chosen. On step 10, lowest-index agents enter the queue
first. A chore o is given to a lowest-index neighbour
with whom it is shared (step 15). */
original consumption graph connecting i and i′ (inside the outer while-cycle,
only neighbors of previously active agents can enter the queue Q), but this path
cannot pass through j (since j was not active yet); thus the original graph
contains a cycle.
The outer while-cycle runs until there are no shared items left; since each
iteration of this cycle reallocates at least one shared items, the algorithm ter-
minates in finite number of steps and outputs an integral allocation x∗. Since
no agent has more than one predecessor, we conclude that x∗ satisfies weighted
PROP1.
It remains to estimate the time-complexity. The allocation x is computed in
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time O(n2m2(n +m)) according to the algorithm of Sandomirskiy and Segal-
Halevi [14]. After that, the consumption graph Gx is computed in time O(n·m).
It has n +m vertices V , and at most n +m − 1 edges E since, by acyclicity,
Gx is a collection of trees. “Root agents” i from the outer while-cycle, one per
each subtree of Gx, can be found in O(|V |+ |E|) = O(n+m) by the depth-first
search. For each such agent i, the internal while-cycle represents breadth-first
exploration of the tree Ti = (Vi, Ei) rooted at i combined with reallocation of
each discovered shared item (takes a constant time). For each tree, breadth-first
search takes time O(|Vi| + |Ei|) and hence the whole outer while-cycle can be
implemented in O(|V |+ |E|) = O(n +m). Thus the overall time-complexity is
determined by the Pareto improvement phase of the algorithm.
Lemma 2. Algorithm 1 returns an integral allocation that is fPO.
Proof. Allocation x is fPO in Step 2. Since x is fPO, due to known results by
Varian [15], it maximizes weighted welfare
∑
i λiui(xi) for some strictly positive
weighting λ = (λi)i∈N of the agents (see also Lemma 2.3 in [14] for a particular
case of mixed items). After that we modify x to x∗ so that Gx∗ is a subgraph of
Gx. Hence each item o is still consumed by agents with highest weighted utility
λi · ui(o). Therefore x
∗ maximizes welfare for the same weighting of the agents
as x. Thus x∗ is fPO as well.
Remark 1 (Flexibility in the algorithm). Proofs of weighted PROP1 and fPO
properties from Lemma 1 and 2 do not rely on the details of the exploration pro-
cedure. For example, instead of the breadth-first search one can use the depth-
first (i.e., the First-In-Last-Out queue Q) or start exploring each connected
component of the consumption graph from an arbitrary agent (not necessary
the one sharing exactly one item). The only condition that is critical is that in
each connected component, the set of explored agents (those that were active
at some point) must be connected during the exploration process. Together
with acyclicity assumption this allows to ensure that no agent has more than
one predecessor and thus use the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1
to deduce PROP1. Also, the choice of the lowest-index agents at Steps 4, 6,
10, and 15 is made for tie-breaking purposes only; instead one can pick such an
agent randomly or use any other heuristic.
This flexibility leads to a family of algorithms that may output different fPO
PROP1 allocations. An interesting question which we leave open is how to pick
the best one among them?
Based on the two lemmas we get the following.
Theorem 1. For mixed utilities, there always exists an integral allocation
that satisfies weighted PROP1 and fPO. Furthermore, there exists a strongly
polynomial-time algorithm in n+m that returns such an allocation.
We obtain several recent results as corollaries of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 (Aziz et al. [2]). For two agents and mixed utilities, a Pareto-optimal
and PROP1 allocation exists and can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
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Corollary 2 (Barman and Krishnamurthy [6]). For positive utilities, an fPO and
PROP1 allocation can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
Corollary 3 (Braˆnzei and Sandomirskiy [7]). For negative utilities, a Pareto-
optimal and weighted PROP1 allocation can be computed in strongly polyno-
mial time if the number of agents or items is fixed.
Example 1 (Illustration of how our algorithm rounds a fractional allocation into
an integral allocation). Consider a fractional allocation x represented in Table 1.
The allocation has the consumption graph with two connected components de-
picted in Figure 1. Since the graph is acyclic, it can be viewed as a pair of trees
rooted with agent 2 and 3.
The fractional allocation is rounded as in Table 2. First the algorithm picks
agent 2 and gives him both goods a and d that he consumes. Agent 1 keeps
his good b and passes chore c to agent 5 who also consumes good h. In the
second connected component, the algorithm picks agent 3 and gives him good
f entirely. Agent 4 gets nothing.
Note that using the flexibility discussed in Remark 1, we can also end up
with another rounding. Let us assume that the outer while-cycle picks agent 1
first in one connected component and agent 4 in the other one. Then agent 1
gets both goods a and b (previously, the good a was allocated by the algorithm
to agent 2) and passes chore c to agent 5, who ends up consuming c and h.
Agent 2 is left with good d only. In the second component, agent 4 gets good f
(previously, he got nothing) and agent 3 receives good g and chore h.
By Theorem 1, both roundings are fPO and PROP1 as long as the original
fractional allocation satisfies fPO and weighted PROP.
a b c d e f g h
1 + + – + – + + +
2 + – – + – + + +
3 + + – – – + + –
4 – + – – – + + –
5 – – – + – – + +
Table 1: Table for Example 1 indicating the signs of the utilities of agents as well as an allo-
cation before the rounding algorithm is applied. A square indicates that the agent consumes
a non-zero amount of the item. The allocation has an acyclic consumption graph represented
in Figure 1.
4. Discussion
Recently, approaches based on maximin share fairness (a property weaker
than proportionality) have been considered for computing fair allocation of in-
divisible goods to asymmetric agents [3, 5, 11]. The results in these papers
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a b c d e f g h
1 + + – + – + + +
2 + – – + – + + +
3 + + – – – + + –
4 – + – – – + + –
5 – – – + – – + +
Table 2: The output of the rounding algorithm for the allocation from Table 1. Note that
each item is consumed by exactly one agent since the the allocation is integral.
2
a
1
b c
5
h
d
3
e f
4
g
Figure 1: The acyclic consumption graph corresponding to the allocation in Table 1.
are either for the case of goods or for chores whereas we consider mixed util-
ities. Our approach uses weighted PROP1 which is a relaxation of the more
traditional proportionality guarantee.
Our strongly polynomial-time algorithm relies in Step 2 on an algorithm
proposed by Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi [14]. One may wonder whether
there is a conceptually simpler self-contained algorithm in Step 2 achieving
an fPO allocation that is an fPO improvement over xprop and has an acyclic
consumption graph. Algorithm 2 satisfies these requirements. It maximizes the
sum of utilities subject to proportionality so the resultant allocation x∗ is fPO
and proportional.
Acyclicity of Gx∗ is ensured by running the while loop. If an interim fPO
allocation x has a cycle C in Gx, there always exists an allocation x
′ such that
all agents get the same utilities and the graph Gx′ is a subgraph of Gx but
does not contain some edge {i, o} from C (existence of x′ follows from a “cyclic
trade” argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.5 from Sandomirskiy and Segal-
Halevi [14]). Therefore, we can put the edge {i, o} to T without affecting the
optimal value of the LP. Thus the consumption graph of the final allocation x∗
contains no cycle C.
Since Algorithm 2 uses linear programming, it only gives a guarantee of
weakly polynomial-time. Note that instead of Algorithm 2, one can simply solve
LPT=∅ via the simplex algorithm which returns a basic feasible solution, i.e, the
extreme point of the set of solutions. It is easy to see that for such an extreme
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Algorithm 2: Algorithm to find a Pareto improvement
Input: An instance I = (N,O, u, y)
Output: fPO allocation x that Pareto improves allocation y and for
which Gx is acyclic
1 Gx ← complete bipartite graph
2 T ← ∅
3 while consumption graph Gx has some cycle C do
4 Solve LPT with optimum value optT :
5 max
∑
i∈N (
∑
o∈O ui(o) · xi,o) s.t.


∑
i∈N
∑
o∈O ui(o) · xi,o ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
o∈O ui(o) · yi,o for all i ∈ N∑
i∈N xi,o = 1 for all o ∈ O
xi,o = 0 for all (i, o) ∈ T
xi,o ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O
if there exists some (i, o) ∈ C such that optT = optT∪{(i,o)} then
6 T ←− T ∪ {(i, o)}
7 return x = x∗
solution x∗, the graph Gx∗ is acyclic. Indeed, if x
∗ contains a cycle C, the
allocation can be represented as the convex combination of allocations obtained
by “forward trade” and “backward trade” along C. The simplex algorithm
works very well in practice but can in theory take exponential time in the worst
case.
Extending the result. We now point out that our result is un-improvable or
challenging to improve in several respects. If PROP1 is replaced by the stronger
property of EF1, then it is an open problem whether an EF1 and PO allocation
exists or not [2]. The problem remains open even for the case of chores.
If PROP1 is strengthened to a concept called proportionality up to the ex-
treme item (PROPX), then the existence of an allocation satisfying the property
is not guaranteed for the case of goods [13]. We provide a self-contained and
simpler example (Example 4).
Finally, one may wonder whether our main result can be strengthened by
considering maximum welfare rather than Pareto optimality. However, comput-
ing an allocation that is utilitarian-maximal within the set of PROP1 allocations
is NP-hard [4].
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Appendix A. Examples
Example 2 (Pareto improvement over a PROP1 allocation may not even satisfy
PROP1 when there are goods. ). Consider the following instance with 3 agents
and 31 items. Items in sets B and C are divided respectively into 10 and 20
smaller items each
A B = {b1, . . . , b10} C = {c1, . . . , c20}
1 0.3 0.2 0.5
2 0.34 0.16 0.5
3 0.16 0.5 0.34
Initially the allocation x is as follows (indicated via the squares). Agent 2
and 3 get utility 0.34 which exceeds the proportionality value. Agent 1 gets
total utility 0.2 but the utility increases to 0.5 if agent 1 additionally gets item
A. Therefore, the allocation is PROP1.
A B = {b1, . . . , b10} C = {c1, . . . , c20}
1 0.3 0.2 0.5
2 0.34 0.16 0.5
3 0.16 0.5 0.34
Suppose we obtain the following Pareto improving allocation y.
A B = {b1, . . . , b10} C = {c1, . . . , c20}
1 0.3 0.2 0.5
2 0.34 0.16 0.5
3 0.16 0.5 0.34
Agent 2 and 3 get utility 0.5 which exceeds the proportionality value. Agent
1 gets total utility 0.3 but even if agent 1 is given any other item, the total
utility does not exceed 1/3. Therefore, allocation y is not PROP1. ⋄
Example 3 (Pareto improvement over a PROP1 allocation may not even satisfy
PROP1 when there are chores.). Consider the following instance with 3 agents
and 12 items. Items in sets A are divided respectively into 10 smaller items.
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A = {a1, . . . , a10} B C
1 –0.4 –0.5 –0.1
2 –0.3 –0.6 –0.1
3 –0.6 –0.1 –0.3
Initially the allocation x is as follows (indicated via the squares). The allo-
cation is PROP1.
A = {a1, . . . , a10} B C
1 –0.4 –0.5 –0.1
2 –0.3 –0.6 –0.1
3 –0.6 –0.1 –0.3
Suppose we obtain the following Pareto improving allocation y.
A = {a1, . . . , a10} B C
1 –0.4 –0.5 –0.1
2 –0.3 –0.6 –0.1
3 –0.6 –0.1 –0.3
Allocation y is not PROP1 because even if agent 1 gets rid of one of the
small A items, her utility is −0.36 < −1/3. ⋄
An integral allocation pi satisfies proportionality up to extreme item
(PROPX) if for each agent i ∈ N ,
• ∀o ∈ pii s.t. ui(o) < 0: ui(pii \ {o}) ≥ ui(O)/n; and
• ∀o /∈ pii s.t. ui(o) > 0: ui(pii ∪ {o}) ≥ ui(O)/n.
Example 4 (a PROPX allocation may not exist for the case of goods).
a b c d e
1 3 3 3 3 1
2 3 3 3 3 1
3 3 3 3 3 1
In any most balanced allocation one agent gets two big items, one agent gets
one big item (utility 3) and the small item e, and one agent gets only one big
item.
a b c d e
1 3 3 3 3 1
2 3 3 3 3 1
3 3 3 3 3 1
The last agent does not achieve the proportionality value of 13/3 > 4 even
if she gets the small item. Therefore PROPX is not satisfied.
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